New START

 ( 2010 In Russia ) 

The obligations must be met within seven years from the date the treaty enters into force. The treaty will last ten years, with an option to renew it for up to five years upon the agreement of both parties.White House, Key Facts about the New START Treaty The treaty entered into force on 5 February 2011, when the United States and Russia exchanged instruments of ratification, following approval by the U.S. Senate and the Federal Assembly of Russia.Treaty text, Article XVI, section 1. The United States began implementing the reductions before the treaty was ratified.

Documents made available to the U.S. Senate described removal from service of at least 30 missile silos, 34 bombers, and 56 submarine launch tubes. Missiles which are removed would stay intact, and bombers could be converted to conventional use. Four of the twenty-four launchers on each of the fourteen ballistic missile nuclear submarines would be removed, and none retired.Peter Baker, "Obama Expands Modernization of Nuclear Arsenal", The New York Times, 13 May 2010

The treaty places no limits on tactical systems, such as the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, which will most likely be replacing the F-15E and F-16 in the tactical nuclear delivery role.Grant, Rebecca. . Air Force Magazine, July 2010

The treaty does not cover rail-mobile ICBM launchers because neither party possesses such systems. ICBMs on such launchers would be covered under the generic launcher limits, but the inspection details for such systems would have to be worked out between the parties if such systems were reintroduced in the future. "Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and their Missiles". United States Department of State, 2 August 2010.

The drafting of the treaty commenced in April 2009 immediately after the meeting between the presidents of the two countries involved, Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, in London. Preliminary talks had already been held in Rome on 27 April, although it was initially planned to have them scheduled in the middle of May.

Prolonged talks were conducted by U.S. and Russian delegations, led on the American side by U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller. The Russian delegation was headed by Anatoly Antonov, director of security and disarmament at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Twists and Turns on Way to Arms Pact With Russia", Peter Baker, New York Times, 26 March 2010.

Talks were held on:

• First round: 19–20 May 2009, Moscow
• Second round: 1–3 June 2009, Geneva, Switzerland
• Third round: 22–24 June 2009, Geneva
• Fourth round: 22–24 July 2009, Geneva
• Fifth round: 31 August – 2 September 2009, Geneva
• Sixth round: 21–28 September 2009, Geneva
• Seventh round: 19–30 October 2009, Geneva
• Eighth round: 9 November 2009, Geneva

On the morning of 6 July 2009, the agreement on the text of the "Joint Understanding on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" was announced, which Medvedev and Obama signed during the US presidential visit to Moscow which began on the same day. The document listed the intention of both parties to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to 1,500–1,675 units, as well as their delivery weapons to 500–1,100 units.

Presidents Obama and Medvedev announced on 26 March 2010 that they had reached an agreement, and they signed the treaty on 8 April 2010 in Prague.

Republicans in the Senate generally deferred to Jon Kyl (R-AZ), a leading conservative on defense issues, who sought a strong commitment to modernize U.S. nuclear forces and questioned whether there was time for ratification during the lame-duck session, calling for an opening of the negotiation record before a vote was held. Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE) joined Kyl in expressing skepticism over the timing of ratification; Senator Kit Bond (R-MO) expressed opposition.

Obama made New START ratification a priority during the 2010 post-election lame duck session of Congress, and Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), the Democratic Chairman and senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were leading supporters of the treaty. Lugar on New START and TacNukes, Arms Control Wonk, 8 July 2010.

On 22 December 2010, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty by a vote of 71 to 26 on the resolution of ratification. Thirteen Republican senators, all 56 Democratic senators, and both Independent senators voted for the treaty. Senate Passes Arms Control Treaty With Russia, 71-26 New York Times Obama signed documents completing the U.S. ratification process on 2 February 2011.

On 29 October, the chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee, Konstantin Kosachev, called for the return of the document to committee hearings, noting that the agreement does not restrict the activities of the United States on missile defense, as well as the fact that ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads are not covered under the agreement. At the same time, Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov proposed to not rush to amend or vote on the treaty and to monitor the discussions in the U.S. Senate.

Following ratification by the U.S. Senate, the formal first reading of the treaty was held on 24 December, and the State Duma voted its approval. The State Duma approved a second reading of the treaty on 14 January 2011. 349 deputies out of 450 voted in favor of ratification.

The third and final reading by the State Duma took place on 25 January 2011; the ratification resolution was approved by a vote of 350 deputies in favor, 96 against, and one abstention. It was then approved unanimously by the Federation Council on the next day.

On 28 January 2011, Medvedev signed the ratification resolution passed by the Federal Assembly, completing the Russian ratification process. The treaty went into force when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exchanged the instruments of ratification at the Security Conference in Munich, Germany, on 5 February 2011.

• No later than (NLT) 5 days after EIF

Exchange Inspection Airplane Information:

Lists of the types of airplanes intended to transport inspectors to points of entry will be exchanged.

• NLT 25 days after EIF

Exchange Lists of Inspectors and Aircrew Members:

Lists of initial inspectors and aircrew will be exchanged.

• NLT 45 days after EIF

Exchange databases:

Databases will provide information on the numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of weapon systems and facilities that are covered under the Treaty.

• NLT 60 days after EIF

Exhibition: Strategic Offensive Arms:

If a type, variant, or version of a strategic offensive arm (SOA) that was not exhibited in connection with the START Treaty is declared, then the SOA's features and technical characteristics must be demonstrated and confirmed.

• 60 days after EIF

Right to Conduct Inspections Begins:

Parties may begin inspections, 18 on-site inspections per year are provided in the Treaty. Each Party is allowed ten Type One Inspections and eight Type Two Inspections.

:#Type One Inspections focus on deployed and non-deployed SOAs sites. Activities include confirming accuracy of data on SOAs, the number of warheads located on designated deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the number of nuclear armaments to be on designated deployed heavy bombers.

:#Type Two Inspections focus on sites with non-deployed SOAs. They can involve confirmation of the conversion/elimination of SOAs, and confirming the elimination of facilities.

• NLT 120 days after EIF

Exhibition: Heavy Bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base:

The United States will conduct a one-time exhibition of each type of environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bombers which are located at the storage facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona.

• NLT 180 days after EIF

Initial Demonstration of Telemetry Playback Equipment:

Parties will conduct an initial demonstration of recording media and playback equipment for telemetric information, information that originates on a missile during its initial motion and flight.

• NLT 225 days after EIF

Exchange Updated Databases:

Parties will exchange updated databases and every six months thereafter for the duration of the Treaty.

• NLT 1 year after EIF

Exhibition: B-1B Heavy Bomber:

The United States will conduct a one-time exhibition of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped with non-nuclear armaments to demonstrate it no longer can employ nuclear armaments.

• NLT 3 years after EIF

Exhibition: Previously Converted Missile Launchers:

The United States will conduct a one-time exhibition of its four SSGNs, which are equipped with cruise missile launchers and were converted from nuclear ballistic submarines, to confirm that SSGNs cannot launch SLBMs. The United States will also hold an exhibition of the five converted ICBM launcher silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, now used as missile defense interceptor launchers. This will confirm that the converted launchers are no longer able to launch ICBMs and determine the features to distinguish converted silo launchers from unconverted ones.

• NLT 7 years after EIF

Meet Central Treaty Limits:

Parties are required to meet the limits laid out in the Treaty for deployed strategic warheads, and deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles and launchers.

• 10 years after EIF

Treaty Expires:

Unless Parties agree with an extension for up to five years.

The Arms Control Association led efforts to rally political support, arguing that the treaty is needed to restore on-site verification and lend predictability to the U.S.–Russian strategic relationship. New START, Arms Control Association. Other organizations supporting the treaty included the Federation of American Scientists, "Responding to Senator Bond on New START." Federation of American Scientists, 23 November 2010 and disarmament expert Peter Wilk of Physicians for Social Responsibility called the New START treaty "essential" to ensuring a safer world and stronger diplomatic ties with Russia.

Republican supporters included former President George H. W. Bush[17], by Mary Beth Sheridan, The Washington Post, 9 December 2010. and all six former Republican Secretaries of State, who wrote supportive op-eds in The Washington Post The Republican case for ratifying New START, by Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Colin L. Powell, The Washington Post, 2 December 2010. and The Wall Street Journal. New Start: Ratify, With Caveats, by Condoleezza Rice, The Wall Street Journal, 7 December 2010. Conservative columnist Robert Kagan who supported the treaty, says its goals are modest compared to previous START treaties and that the treaty should not fail because of partisan disagreements. Kagan said the Republican insistence on upgrading the U.S. nuclear arsenal was reasonable but would not be affected by the current language of the treaty.

Heritage Action, an advocacy group affiliated with The Heritage Foundation, took the lead in opposing New START, lobbying the Senate along with running a petition drive and airing political advertisements before November's midterm elections. The effort drew the support of likely presidential candidate Mitt Romney and has been credited by former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle as changing some Republican votes. According to Edwin Feulner, then president of The Heritage Foundation, the language of the New START treaty would "definitely" reduce America's nuclear weapon capacity but "wouldn't necessarily" reduce Russia's, and Russia would maintain a 10–1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons, which are not counted in the treaty.

Arms control experts critical of the treaty included Robert Joseph, former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, and Eric Edelman, undersecretary of defense for policy, who have written that the treaty weakens U.S. defenses. Former CIA Director James Woolsey also said that "concessions to Russian demands make it difficult to support Senate approval of the new treaty".

Senators Jon Kyl and Mitch McConnell complained about a lack of funding for the Next-Generation Bomber during the treaty debate, even though this treaty would not constrain this platform.Kyl, Jon. "The New Start Treaty: Time for a Careful Look." Wall Street Journal, 8 July 2010.Trinko, Katrina. "McConnell on new START: 'A Flawed, Mishandled Treaty'." National Review, 20 December 2010. During the Senatorial debate over the US ratification of the New START Treaty with Russia, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) stated, "Russia cheats in every arms control treaty we have with them", which caused an uproar in Russian media. Additionally, there were concerns about the possibility of restrictions being imposed on the deployment of missile defense systems by the U.S.

The Pentagon's "Report on the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation Pursuant to Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012" found that even if Russia did cheat and achieved a total surprise attack with a breakout force, it would have "little to no effect" on U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities.

Current information on the aggregate numbers and the locations of nuclear weapons has been made public under the treaty, and on 13 May 2011, three former U.S. officials and two non-proliferation experts signed an open letter to both sides asking that the information be released to promote transparency, reduce mistrust, and support the nuclear arms control process in other states. These are the most recent values reported from inspection activities.

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, inspections of missile sites of both the US and Russia, typically conducted to ensure compliance with the treaty, were suspended.

In July 2020, US and Russian officials met in Vienna for arms control talks. The US invited China to join, but the latter country made it clear that it would not participate. Discussions continued between the US and Russia, with the US proposing a binding statement for Russia to sign. This would include an outline for a new treaty, which would cover all Russian nuclear weapons and expand the current monitoring and verification regime implemented by New START, with the goal of bringing China into a future treaty.

In mid-October, Putin proposed to "extend the current agreement without any pre-conditions at least for one year", but Trump rejected this. Subsequently, Russian officials agreed to a US proposal to freeze nuclear warhead production for a year and to extend the treaty by a year. US Department of State spokesperson Morgan Ortagus stated that "We appreciate the Russian Federation's willingness to make progress on the issue of nuclear arms control" and that the US was "prepared to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement".

Russian spokesman Dmitry Peskov replied that his country "stands for extending the treaty" and is waiting to see the details of the US proposal. On 27 January, the Russian State Duma voted to ratify the extension. On 3 February, five days after Putin signed this legislation, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the U.S. had formally agreed to extend the treaty for five years, until 2026. United States extends nuclear treaty with Russia for five years, Washington Post, 3 February 2021.